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French DNCG Management Control versus European UEFA Financial 
Fair Play: A Divergent Conception of Financial Regulation Objectives 
The French Football Federation was the first football governing body to put in place, in 
1990, a financial regulation system. It might be expected that UEFA’s Financial Fair 
Play (FFP) system established in 2010 would be similar to French DNCG (National 
Direction for Management Control) regulations. However, while FFP is concerned with 
profitability, DNCG is focused on solvency. Hence, a French club may be loss making 
and not compliant with FFP, while at the same time being solvent in accordance with 
DNCG rules. Our research confirms that most French clubs do not conform with FFP 
rules. As such, it provides further evidence that DNCG has not prevented poor financial 
management within French clubs. The coexistence of DNCG and FFP – or any other 
domestic financial regulation and FFP – may result in disparities between domestic 
clubs. As a consequence, there should be consistent financial regulation in all European 
leagues. 
Keywords: professional football, financial regulation, Financial Fair Play, Europe, 
France  
Introduction 
For many years European football clubs were in a persistent loss-making situation.1 French 
clubs are not an exception.2 The French Football Federation (FFF) was the first football 
governing body to put in place, in 1990, a regulation system which seeks to prevent 
insolvency. The objective was to ensure the integrity of championships which would be 
threatened by a club going out of business mid-season. From 1987 to 1990, 14 clubs became 
insolvent in the French first two divisions.3 Several more clubs were in financial difficulties, 
requiring local authorities to cover their liabilities.4 In practice this means that taxpayers 
effectively funded French football debts, a social consequence widespread in European 
football.5 The dilemma for a local authority faced with a football club in financial difficulty is 
as follows: should it cover the club’s liabilities at the expense of its taxpayers or instead let 
the club become insolvent and hence relegated, resulting in local football fans not having 
access to professional football anymore, something which may be socially detrimental for 
local communities? The creation of the French management control organisation, the 
National Direction for Management Control (DNCG), has sought to minimize the risk of 
local authorities facing such dilemmas. Since 2010, UEFA has established its own financial 
regulation system, introducing Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations for clubs qualified to 
participate in its Europe wide club competitions. UEFA’s implementation of FFP is based on 
a public interest argument for regulation, specifically that the long-run integrity of its 
competitions is asserted to be for the greater good of football and hence by extension for 
society generally.6 DNCG welcomed UEFA’s decisions, describing the new regulations as 
the creation of a ‘European DNCG’.7 
Nevertheless, the implementation of FFP in 2013 has revealed significant divergences 
between the two financial regulation systems, something evidenced most visibly in the case 
of Paris Saint-Germain (PSG). Indeed, while the DNCG did not punish PSG in respect of 
season 2013-2014, it was heavily sanctioned by UEFA under FFP; specifically, a fine of €60 
million, and restrictions on its player recruitment and on the number of players authorised to 
take part in European competitions.8 This different regulatory assessment could be the result 
of a fundamental divergence between the two systems concerning their objectives and in 
particular the treatment of losses and the role of a club’s shareholders. Under the DNCG 
philosophy, a club is permitted to make losses as long as its shareholders finance or cover 
such losses by equity contributions. FFP, however, is based on the idea that clubs must live 
within their means, that is to say to balance their football expenditure with income generated 
from football activities. Hence in this case shareholder investment has been limited to 
investing in facilities and/or development-type activities.  
Hereafter, the aim of this contribution is to establish whether the DNCG approach 
leads French clubs to adopt behaviours that are not consistent with FFP. If this is the case, 
this is problematic for those French clubs which are required to comply with FFP, 
specifically those clubs which seek to participate in UEFA’s European competitions. 
Moreover, this divergence in regulation, in regulatory targets and consequently in regulatory 
response among target clubs will create disparities among French clubs, these becoming more 
marked if, as anticipated, FFP becomes more onerous over the medium to long term. In order 
to achieve the objective stated above, this study will provide evidence on: 
• The extent to which French clubs are loss-making. 
• The extent to which these clubs’ shareholders make financial contributions to 
compensate for such losses. 
• The extent to which these financial contributions restrict longer term investment into 
clubs. 
The originality of this contribution is three fold: 
• First, this study of French football finance is carried out at the level of each club 
rather than for the league as a whole as is the case in previous literature.9 
• Second, the focus of this study is on club balance sheet data rather than on profit and 
loss account information as has been common previously. 
• Third, this study considers the first national football financial regulation system in 
Europe and its impact on French clubs’ ability to face the pan-European FFP 
regulations. 
This article is structured in six parts. The first consists of a literature review on these 
questions, followed by an explanation of the objectives of financial regulation of football 
clubs in France and Europe. The third section focuses on the methodological framework, with 
the appropriate financial ratios presented in the following section. The fifth section presents 
the results in respect of each of our questions before concluding in a sixth part. 
Literature review 
There are numerous academic publications that demonstrate the chronic absence of 
profitability for professional football clubs in European open leagues.10 In France, different 
contributions have dealt with this topic.11 Among these works, Andreff attributes clubs’ 
persistent loss-making to ‘undisciplined club behavior and lack of transparency and 
disclosure. French football is characterized by a lax financial management and a soft-budget 
constraint at the club level. Shareholders behave as non-profit-seeking investors or patrons.’12 
These chronic financial difficulties led to insolvencies that Scelles et al., based on a study 
over the period 1970-2014, attribute partially to insufficient stadium attendance (demand 
shocks).13 Works focusing more specifically on the French regulation system are less 
common but include Dermit-Richard on the question of the legitimacy of the financial 
regulation system in French football,14 and on the necessary independence of the regulator.15 
Elsewhere Gouguet and Primault suggest that the French regulation system is responsible for 
constraining French club losses when compared to clubs in other European countries.16 
Concomitant with these works on French professional football, a number of recent 
publications have focused on UEFA’s FFP regulations. Some are concerned in part at least 
with the objectives of the system,17 and more specifically in considering to what extent FFP is 
a tool for controlling the labour market, in conflict with the rules of the European Union 
treaty.18 There are also some studies on the expected effects of FFP. For example, Peeters and 
Szymanski use econometric modelling to establish the anticipated consequence of the 
implementation of the break-even requirement on club payrolls.19 Using a game theory 
approach Preuss, Haugen and Schubert considered FFP effects that could be contrary to 
expected objectives.20 Franck’s and Franck and Lang’s focus was on the opportunity to 
introduce hard budget constraints to promote or incentivise more responsible management of 
football clubs, in turn lessening dependency on their shareholders.21 Finally, the legitimacy of 
the FFP objectives is investigated by Budzinski and Müller, Lammert and Hovemann.22 
As has been demonstrated while it is clear that both DNCG and FFP regulations have 
considered extensively in the literature, to date they have not been compared. Andreff does 
assess both systems of regulation against his recommendations for hardening clubs’ budget 
constraints, but does so without really comparing them, instead simply suggesting some 
complementarities.23 Given the specific aim of this contribution, the approach adopted is to 
focus on the extent to which there is convergence or divergence of regulatory systems. This 
has already been considered in other sectors such as banking sector24 and the securities 
markets25. For the former, for example, Spendzharova examines the implications of the 
supervisory approaches developed in Central and Eastern Europe over the past 15 years in 
respect of redesigning the regulatory framework in the EU. In European football, the 
peculiarity is that the transnational system of regulation applies only to those clubs which 
qualify to participate in European competitions. This means that the clubs which play in both 
domestic and transnational competitions are obliged either: to follow two distinct systems of 
financial regulation while this is not the case for the other clubs which participate only in 
domestic competitions; or in countries in which there is no domestic system of financial 
regulation, clubs taking part in European competitions are subject to the transnational 
regulation yet their domestic competitions are effectively unregulated in financial terms. The 
extent to which this may create disparities between clubs depends on the respective 
objectives of the two financial regulation systems and whether their potential divergences 
impact clubs’ financial behaviours. 
The objectives of the financial regulation of football clubs in open leagues 
Concerned with perceived risks arising from persistent loss-making among member 
organisations, specific sectorial regulations have been implemented in professional team 
sports leagues (for example, in football, rugby, basketball, handball, volleyball and ice 
hockey in France). Such regulation systems are defined in a limited regulatory space, 
geographically and sectorally, where specific tools (financial controls, constraints, sanctions) 
are implemented under the aegis of regulation bodies so as to reach a/some objective(s) 
generally defined collectively by the actors of the regulated sector.26 
In 1990, under the aegis of the Ministry of Sports, French football stakeholders 
established a regulatory system concerned with the administration and finances of 
professional clubs, with its operationalization entrusted to the DNCG. In the context of the 
financial distress which was characterising French football at that juncture, the regulation 
objective assigned to this authority was to control the solvency of professional clubs so as to 
avoid within-season insolvencies that threaten the integrity of the league competition.27 This 
objective required the DNCG: 
to check that clubs have the financial means (cash, shareholders’ equity) to 
complete the competitions in which they are registered, [but] does not prevent us 
[the DNCG] from looking to ensure operating profits and cash in the medium 
term; and in particular to ensure that contractual commitments (e.g. player 
contracts) are covered by future income streams which are considered reasonably 
secure.28 
For this purpose, the DNCG requires that: 
clubs registered in competitions have the required shareholder funding in place to 
carry out their activity and fulfil their obligations without risk of a potential 
period of crisis’, being specified that ‘the more a club’s operations are rebalanced 
as to their fundamentals [recurring expenditure balanced by recurring income], 
the lower the requirements for shareholder funding.29 
Central to the French system is a requirement that a club must be able to call on funding from 
its shareholders in circumstances in which its operating sources are not sufficient. 
In 2004, UEFA introduced a club licensing system applicable to all clubs participating in 
UEFA Champions’ League and Europa League competitions. Participation in the 
competitions achieved on sporting merit is thus subordinated to being awarded a license 
based on administrative, legal, infrastructure and financial criteria.  
The licensing system has also enabled the compilation of financial data for those 664 
European football clubs which have taken part in licensing since 2004. Of concern for UEFA 
was the fact that these figures showed that clubs had reported an increase in losses up to 
€1675 million in 201130 (€1641 million in 2010).31 It is these figures, and concern over the 
possible consequences of these figures, that encouraged UEFA to establish a system of 
financial regulation in respect of its competitions. The aims of the regulations are reproduced 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
 
FFP is about encouraging clubs to improve the management of their cost base, 
achieving a sustainable balance between income, spending and investments; in simple terms 
to live within their means. It is unavoidable that some clubs have more and larger income 
sources than others for reasons related to history, population or market demand. Nevertheless, 
the key requirement in FFP is that clubs should report a break-even position, calculated by 
comparing relevant income and costs, over a rolling three-year period, subject to what is 
termed ‘an acceptable level of deviation’. Specifically, in any monitoring period a club can 
report an aggregate loss of €5m, while a further deviation or loss of initially €45m, but 
declining to €30m, is permitted as long as such excess is fully covered by equity injections 
from a club’s owners and/or related parties.33 Hence, the intention is that clubs should not 
resort to shareholder funding and/or banks/debts to compensate for ordinary loss making 
activity. 
In calculating break-even, clubs need only include ‘relevant income’ and ‘relevant 
costs’.34 At its simplest the intention is that clubs should seek to match football expenditure 
with football income. Relevant income is defined as: 
revenue from gate receipts, broadcasting rights, sponsorship and advertising, 
commercial activities and other operating income, plus either profit on disposal of 
player registrations or income from disposal of player registrations, excess 
proceeds on disposal of tangible fixed assets and finance income.35 
Any relevant income and expenses from related parties must also be adjusted to reflect the 
fair value of such transactions.36 Definitions are provided for both related parties and fair 
value,37 with the revised regulations extending the definition of related parties such that 
sponsors or anyone else who contributes in excess of 30% of a club’s income may be 
investigated to determine whether they are related to the club’s ownership.38  
Moreover, equity investment is still permitted where the funds are to be invested in 
respect of longer term assets such as the construction or the renovation of stadia or youth 
development facilities.  
FFP thus seeks to force clubs to report a balanced financial outturn dependent on their 
own football related income sources, while encouraging longer term investments which in 
principle ought to provide the basis of improved future financial performance. That the break-
even calculation is calculated over a rolling period of three years thus makes it possible to 
compensate an annual deficit by previous year profits. The approach adopted recognises both 
that equilibrium will have to be reached gradually for some clubs and that football financial 
performance in often skewed by uncontrollable football performance. 
There is thus a fundamental divergence in the anticipated role played by the 
shareholders (and related parties) between DNCG and FFP. Under the French system, clubs 
are not required to break even as long as their shareholders are willing and able to 
compensate for the consequence of loss making by, for example, the cancellation of loans, 
the provision of new loans and/or equity injections. In contrast the UEFA system does not 
permit shareholder contributions to compensate for current operating losses, except 
exceptionally during the implementation of the process, as well as in future under the terms 
of the voluntary agreement for break-even set out in Annex X11.39 The aim of this paper is to 
study this divergence of conception and in particular to determine if French club shareholders 
regularly provide funding to compensate for losses, in contradiction with UEFA FFP 
principles. 
Methodology 
We use DNCG annual reports. In their appendix, the DNCG publishes the balance sheet and 
the profit and loss account of each professional football club. While each set of financial 
statements is prepared and published by individual clubs, their reliability and legitimacy is 
validated by the DNCG. In addition, the data has been consistently prepared between clubs 
over time and hence is comparable. The presentations of the annual accounts of Lens and 
Lyon differ as these clubs report using consolidated accounts. Nevertheless, they are 
homogeneous over the period. That said there remain at least two limitations with the data. 
The first is the possibility of the football club being structured as part of a group of 
companies (for example, including separate entities in respect of youth development or 
commercial activities) and changes in the constitution of that group over time, all of which 
could influence the variation of the net worth. However, for all organisations included in the 
sample the most significant activity is that of a professional football club. The second 
limitation is concerned with a potential lack of comparability within sets of club accounts due 
to either the legitimate adoption of different accounting policies and/or differences in the 
interpretation and judgement of particular accounting policies. 
Shareholder contributions to a club can take three different forms, each of which it 
will be necessary to identify in the annual accounts, as follows: 
• First, it can take the form of a capital (equity) contribution or reduction. The 
published accounts indicate only the club’s net worth (NW), without detailing its 
components, that is capital (C), reserves and/or balance brought forward (BBF) and 
annual net profit (NP) (NW = C + BBF + NP). NW and NP are disclosed on an annual 
basis, with the level of NP impacting directly on NW. NW is also influenced by 
shareholder investment decisions; positively (through a capital or equity contribution) 
or negatively (through a dividend distribution). Hence, it is possible to calculate the 
annual variation in NW arising from shareholder capital contributions (CC) using the 
following formula with n for the current year and n-1 for the previous year: 
 CC = NWn - (NWn-1 + NPn) (1) 
• Second, a shareholder may contribute loan capital to a club, usually on a short term 
basis. Shareholders’ accounts are indicated on a specific balance sheet line, and thus it 
is possible to establish the level of loans (positive variation between n and n-1) or 
annual repayments to the shareholder (negative variation between n and n-1) for this 
item.40 
• Third, a shareholder’s contribution may take the form of a cancellation of loan which 
is then included as an exceptional item in the profit or loss account of the club. This 
cancellation can be permanent or accompanied by a ‘claw-back provision’. In this last 
case, it may be possible to have to repay to the shareholder, all or a part of a previous 
cancellation if some conditions, previously defined in the provision, are not met. In 
such cases, any ‘recovery’ of the cancellation is disclosed as an exceptional expense. 
These figures can be significant: for example, equivalent to €125 million for season 
2013-2014 (€66 million for the previous season), and hence require to be accounted 
for in this analysis. However their identification is complex. Indeed, these figures are 
not disclosed in individual club financial statements. As such it is necessary to 
estimate these figures based upon information published in the press, subsequently 
cross-checking these figures between individual accounts and aggregated data by 
group of clubs published by DNCG. The figure for cancellation of loans is 
understated because not all cancellations are disclosed. However, those cancellations 
which could be reasonably estimated have been included.  
The club Paris Saint-Germain requires a specific comment. It receives an annual sum 
of €200 million in respect of sponsorship from the Qatar Tourism Authority (QTA) which is 
related to its owner Qatar Sports Investments (Qatar Investment Authority). Under FFP 
UEFA judged that the “fair value” of the previous sponsoring agreement was €100 million 
with the remaining €100 million considered as an equity contribution made by a related party. 
For the purposes of this study this has been included as a contribution by a shareholder and 
has thus been considered as an annual cancellation of debt for the two seasons concerned 
from 2012 to 2014. 
The clubs included in our sample study are those clubs in respect of which data is 
available over the longest possible time period. DNCG began to publish individual club 
balance sheets from season 2003-2004, clubs providing the information on a voluntary basis. 
It was not until 2008-2009 that all clubs were required to provide their balance sheets. In 
practice, however, all clubs other than AJ Auxerre and Saint-Etienne published their balance 
sheets from season 2006-2007, and hence that was adopted as the starting point for our 
analysis. Season 2013-2014 was the most recent season for which accounts were available at 
the time of writing and as a result our analysis focuses on the period from 2006 to 2014, eight 
seasons in total. Clubs concerned are all those having published their annual accounts over 
the entire period, namely those having taken part on a permanent basis between 2006 and 
2014 in the professional championships of Ligue 1 and 2 (other than AJ Auxerre and Saint-
Etienne where data is only available from 2006). In total 24 clubs satisfy these criteria (see 
Appendix). The data represents 87% of clubs competing in Ligue 1 in the relevant seasons 
(equivalent to a sample of 139 Ligue 1 clubs’ financial statements from a total of 160 
possible sets of financial statements over eight seasons). The cumulative level of budgets and 
transfer profits of the 24 clubs in the sample represents 85% of the entire professional league 
clubs (Ligue 1 and 2) over the period studied. Indeed, the total income and transfer profit 
over the period for the 24 clubs of the sample is €10,598 million whereas the total 
corresponding to the whole clubs of Ligue 1 and 2 over the period is €12,408 million. 
Consequently, this sample can be considered as representative of French professional football 
and thus conclusions that could be drawn will be generalizable. 
Data processing 
In order to answer the questions set out in the introduction, it is necessary to consider three 
variables: club financial outturn, shareholders’ contributions and investments. 
The variable representing club financial outturn is net profit (NP). We identified 
annual profits and losses, the cumulative profits and losses over the time period, and the 
cumulative net profit/loss position: 
• CL = cumulative losses over the period 
• CP = cumulative profits over the period 
• CNP = cumulative net profit/(loss) over the period = CL + CP 
• I corresponds to the club’s income including both operating revenues – for example, 
gate receipts, TV rights, merchandising, sponsoring and other commercial revenues – 
and the transfer contribution. The latter corresponds to transfer fees received from any 
player sales less any unamortised cost included in intangible assets on the balance 
sheet. 
• CNP / I determines the accumulated net profit over the period as a percentage of the 
accumulated income over the same period. 
We will then determine the total of shareholders’ contributions over the period so as 
to calculate the ratio of losses covered by equity contributions. For this purpose, the 
following data are defined: 
• CCC = cumulative contributions in capital over the period determined by addition of 
CC (see above for definition) 
• CCA = cumulative contribution in shareholders’ loan accounts over the period 
• CCL = cumulative cancellations of loans over the period 
• CSC = cumulative shareholders’ contributions over the period = CCC + CCA + CCL 
• CovL = Sum of the contribution in capital used to cover losses (if any) = the smallest 
of the two values between negative NP and total shareholders’ contribution (CSC) 
• %CovL = value in percentage terms of the total shareholders’ contributions = CovL / 
CSC 
• SCI = shareholders’ contribution available for investment = CSC - NP. It should be 
noted that this figure is only meaningful when it is positive.  
Finally, we will determine the level of investments made by each club over the period. 
It will be then possible to determine that part of shareholders’ contributions not used to cover 
losses, and which thus contributes to a club’s funding. 
• Inv = cumulative sum of net investments both in transfer fees and in other 
investments (tangible and financial). Data available does not allow the determination 
of the gross level of investments. Only the level of investments net of amortisations is 
published. For the purpose of the analysis, this limitation is not significant. Therefore, 
we can calculate shareholders’ contributions to investments, net of self-financing. The 
use of this data will thus enable us to determine to what extent shareholders’ 
contributions are used to develop or enhance the club. Inv can be positive, indicating 
an increase of club net investments, or negative, meaning a net disinvestment over the 
period corresponding usually to a decrease of sums invested in player transfer fees. 
• Inv / I determines the amount of investment over the period as a percentage of income 
over a comparable duration. 
• %Inv = percentage of investments covered by shareholders = Inv / SCI 
All these indicators are presented per club, accumulated over the period studied (see 
Appendix). 
Results 
Net profit 
First, it is necessary to verify that clubs make losses. The question is studied here for each 
club and not only for the league as a whole given that aggregated data compensate losses by 
some with profits by others. In addition, we will measure how these losses/benefits divide up 
over the period with the determination of the number of loss-making/profitable years. Last, 
we will determine to what extent benefits for some years compensate losses for others. These 
elements are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
 
In Table 2, clubs are classified on the basis of CNP (before cancellations of loans) as 
a percentage of their income over the same period as in Table 1. 
 
Table 2 
 
Around 80% (19 out of 24) of clubs make net losses over the period from 2006 to 
2014. Nevertheless, these losses represent more than 5% of their income for only eight clubs 
(33%). 20% of clubs in the sample report cumulated losses greater than 10% of their income 
(as high as 39% for AS Monaco). The comparable ratio for European clubs as a whole for 
season 2011-2012 is 37.3% (260 clubs out of 696).41 Therefore, while French clubs are loss-
making they report lower deficits when compared to their European competitors. This finding 
is consistent with research carried out by Gouguet and Primault over the period 1998 to 2003, 
who suggested that French football faced a financial crisis less serious than the other 
European countries due to the regulation implemented in French football based on ‘solidarity 
(revenue sharing), training (by all clubs), and financing control’.42 
All clubs have known at least two loss-making years over the eight year period 
studied, with a mean of 4.24 years of losses per club. Two clubs (PSG and AS Monaco) have 
been loss-making in each of the eight accounting years. 
The ratio CL / CP measures the extent to which losses are covered by subsequent 
profits. A coefficient less than 1 means that all losses were covered by profits and that hence 
the club reports a cumulated positive NP over the period. A coefficient greater than 1 means 
that cumulated losses exceed cumulated profits, leading thus to a net loss which under DNCG 
regulations would require to be compensated by the club’s shareholders. As mentioned 
above, in this study19 clubs out of 24 have losses equivalent to between 1.29 times to more 
than 100 times their profits over the time period. Three clubs are excluded from this 
calculation: PSG and AS Monaco which have been loss-making every year, making this 
calculation meaningless; and Stade Rennais which reported a net profit exactly equal to 0 in 
six of the eight accounting years, suggesting that the club’s owner has systematically 
balanced club accounts for these years, either by cancellation of loans (reported as an 
exceptional profit in French club accounts) or by reimbursement of previously cancelled 
loans. This policy did not apply, however, over the last two seasons 2012 to 2014 both of 
which were loss-making. It was not possible to determine with sufficient precision the 
amount of these cancellations and reimbursement of previously cancelled loans so as to 
enable them to be taken into account. 
Covering of losses by shareholders 
According to the DNCG philosophy, it is a requirement for shareholders to guarantee their 
club’s funding for the coming season. As such, shareholders are obliged to provide sufficient 
funds to cover prior year losses. It is thus necessary to measure these contributions (CSC) and 
their use in covering losses (CovL). These variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
 
These results enable the identification of three groups of clubs: 
(1) Group 1 - six clubs which did not use shareholder contributions to at least part fund 
their losses (%CovL = 0). There were two different reasons for this: 
• They did not make contributions to capital over the period (CSC < 0). Based on 
available data we cannot be certain as to the precise explanation. One hypothesis is 
that these clubs made a dividend distribution (for example, Toulouse FC and FC 
Lorient both reported positive NP over the period). 
• They did not make net losses as was the case for AC Ajaccio, Dijon FCO and 
Montpellier HSP. 
(2) Group 2 - eight clubs which made losses and which used shareholder contributions to 
cover these. (The percentage covered ranged from 40% (LOSC) to 88% (OL)). 
(3) Group 3 - 10 clubs which made losses that were entirely covered by shareholder 
contributions (%CovL = 100%). 
Reflecting on Table 3 overall, it is clear that shareholders make a major contribution 
to covering their clubs’ losses given that 74% (total CovL / total CSC) of funds provided 
were used to that end. 
Funding of investments by shareholders 
It remains to be determined whether clubs invest in infrastructure and/or transfer fees paid to 
recruit players (Inv) and, in particular, the extent to which their shareholders contribute to this 
funding (%Inv). For comparative purposes in Table 4 this investment is shown as a 
percentage of each club’s income.  
 
Table 4 
 
Table 5 disaggregates the total sum invested over the period distinguishing investment 
in transfer fees and other investments, as well as identifying clubs which have invested and 
those which have disinvested. 
 
Table 5 
 
It is interesting to observe that the total net investment over the period (€553 million) 
equates to less than one year of TV rights for Ligue 1 clubs (87.5% of TV rights in 2012-
2013 equal to €632 million). On average net investment represents only 3.64% of each club’s 
income over the time period. More detailed analysis shows that 53% (€295 million) is 
accounted for through investments made by PSG. Excluding PSG, net investments by the 
other 23 clubs in the sample accounts for only 2.85% of their income (Inv except PSG = 
553,085 - 295,396 and B except PSG = 10,597,978 - 1,552,545). Overall this evidence 
suggests a very low level of investment by French clubs compared to business in other 
sectors of the economy. 
Of the total investment made by French clubs over the time period, 64% is in respect 
of player transfer fees. Among these fees, 72% (€257 million) is accounted for by PSG 
investment over the last three seasons since the club was taken over by QTA. In total 13 clubs 
out of 24 have reduced their investments in the form of transfer fees over the period. 
Furthermore, only 36% of total investment (€198 million) has been invested in club 
infrastructure (i.e. tangible fixed assets), i.e. less than a third of one year’s TV rights or 
1.86% of club income. This figure included €124 million invested by two clubs in their new 
stadia (Olympique Lyonnais €88m; Lille OSC €36m). Over the same time period, seven 
clubs have reduced their investments in infrastructure by a global amount of €51 million. 
Among the 15 clubs which have made net investments, nine clubs have taken 
advantage of their shareholders’ contributions to do so, ranging from 20% of invested sums 
(Olympique Lyonnais) to 100% (AS Monaco, Girondins de Bordeaux and Dijon FCO). If 
100% of the shareholders’ contributions were used for investments, this would be equivalent 
to 10% of clubs’ income, that is five times greater than the actual figures reported. Finally it 
is also interesting to note that three clubs report a %Inv > 100%, what means that in effect 
shareholder contributions have increased the clubs’ working capital. 
It is possible to conclude from this data that investment represents a very modest 
component of clubs’ budgets, with the majority (two thirds) being invested in player transfer 
fees. Only 26% of shareholder contributions (€280 million for a total of €1,064 million) are 
used in respect of funding investments, compared to 74% used to fund losses. 
Conclusion 
Based on the objectives of the article, it is possible to provide the following answers: 
• With 19 loss-making clubs out of 24, it appears that profitability measured by positive 
cumulative net profit is not a priority for French clubs. Consistent with Sloane’s 
framework of open leagues,43 the evidence suggests that French clubs prioritise 
sporting performance above profitability. In particular, the evidence suggests that 
clubs recruit to the maximum of their financial capacity.44 
• Over the period, the total of net cumulative contributions by shareholders is greater 
than €1 billion (see Table 3) with 74% used to cover losses. The recurring need for 
shareholder contributions to fund losses in 18 out of 19 clubs highlights a specificity 
of this particular business sector; something which is permissible under DNCG 
regulations. 
• For nine of these clubs, shareholder contributions are actually insufficient to cover 
losses and hence clubs are forced to disinvest or downsize their business. Among the 
nine remaining clubs, there are six clubs for which shareholders invest beyond 
covering losses. Shareholder investment is also evident for three profit-making clubs. 
The principle set by DNCG that clubs’ shareholders must cover losses has been applied in 
reality. 
The main objective of DNCG is to ensure clubs’ solvency, with shareholder 
contributions being required to cover any losses. By contrast, FFP seeks to encourage 
sustainability, the principle being that clubs are able to fund their own football activities and 
ambitions from their own football-related resources, with shareholders only permitted to 
contribute to the funding of clubs’ long-term investments. Our results show that French clubs 
make losses that shareholders require to cover in order to respect DNCG constraints. As a 
consequence, shareholder contributions are primarily used to fund transfer fees rather than 
long-term investments such as stadia or other infrastructure. In general terms our evidence 
indicates that French clubs are not complying with FFP principles. As such the objective of 
DNCG and in particular its requirements in respect of the role of shareholders are not 
sufficiently constraining to induce French clubs to also comply with FFP. DNCG did not 
change its philosophy to be consistent with FFP, and as a result French clubs are ill-equipped 
to satisfy the new European football rules. Consistent with this analysis, Paris SG and AS 
Monaco are the two clubs which make the largest deficits, both of which have been 100% 
covered by their shareholders as required by DNCG. The same two clubs have also both been 
penalised by UEFA under FFP: Paris SG in 201445 and AS Monaco in 2015.46 
The main contribution of this article is to show that the regulatory objective of French 
DNCG, where clubs are permitted to make losses as long as these are compensated by 
shareholders, inadvertently acts to place these clubs in contradiction with FFP requirements. 
In marked contrast to the desire of French clubs that any system of FFP ought to be akin to a 
‘European DNCG’, in practice these clubs now find themselves conflicted due to the different 
requirements and philosophies underpinning the two financial regulation systems which 
many are subject to. Reflecting on prior studies on financial regulation in French football but 
based upon more recent data all of which was exclusively at the level of the club, this study 
supports Andreff’s findings rather than those of Gouguet and Primault.47 
It is worth noting that UEFA has recently opened the door to short term financial 
behaviour consistent with French DNCG. In May 2015, UEFA announced its intention to 
relax or ‘enhance’ its regulations to allow clubs a period of accelerated spending on players if 
they present an affordable business model and provide irrevocable funding commitments 
from their shareholders.48 In July 2015, the sanctions on Paris Saint-Germain were partially 
lifted,49 a decision confirmed by the CFCB in September 2015.50 Notwithstanding these 
enhancements, FFP still seeks to encourage growth and development in the long term. 
Having been the original European regulation system, it will be interesting to observe 
whether French DNCG now moves closer to FFP and limits shareholder contributions in the 
future. For a reason developed below, it can be argued that this is likely to be the case. 
The coexistence of DNCG and FFP has the potential to create disparities between 
clubs. In order to illustrate this, three types of clubs can be distinguished: those which comply 
with both DNCG and FFP (having qualified for European competitions); those which expect 
to qualify for European competitions and hence comply with both systems even if they are 
not monitored by UEFA; and those which do not expect to qualify for European 
competitions, which do not comply or seek to comply with FFP and which hence risk being 
denied the right to participate in European competition even where their football performance 
merits such participation. The existence of dual regulation can create a ‘competitive 
advantage’ for the latter type of club, albeit most likely around avoiding relegation given that 
ostensibly the club is unconcerned with European qualification. Hence we could have a 
situation in which two clubs could be in competition with one another to avoid relegation yet 
not be subject to the same financial regulation rules, with one club complying with both 
DNCG and FFP (even if it is not monitored by UEFA), while the other complies with DNCG 
only. While Andreff (2015, p. 217) is supportive of the complementarities between the two 
systems in terms of encouraging good governance, at the same time it needs to be recognised 
that their coexistence may contribute to sporting unfairness. 
A provocative question that follows from the foregoing would be: should the French 
league apply FFP for all of its clubs, in turn abandoning DNCG principles in place since 
1990? In other words, does FFP mean that DNCG rules are no longer relevant? It is worth 
noting that what is described for France regarding DNCG versus FFP and sporting fairness 
can be applied to all other European national leagues; simply replace DNCG by another (or 
no) domestic financial regulation system different from FFP. This suggests that all European 
national leagues should apply FFP rules rather than the latter being confined to those clubs 
taking part in European competitions. Adoption of a transnational approach to regulation is 
consistent with what has been suggested for the banking sector, i.e. with responsibility for 
regulation being transferred to a European institution.51 Returning to the French case, 
applying FFP rules could have a positive impact on French clubs given that DNCG did not 
prevent some of its clubs from becoming insolvent and hence being sanctioned via 
relegation,52 these clubs including a couple whose new stadia were funded at least in part by 
public money. Given this and the broader issue of the continuing social and community 
significance of football clubs, encouraging improved club financial management would be 
beneficial not only for clubs themselves but also for local communities. 
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Appendix 
Data used classified per club (Continued) 
 
ACA AJA GB SB29 SMC LBC 
Cumulative losses -6,387 -29,411 -36,718 -4,486 -4,839 -1,598 
Cumulative profits before 
cancellations of loans 6,960 4,391 21,513 3,470 3,042 958 
Cumulative net profit (CNP) before 
cancellations of loans 573 -25,020 -15,205 -1,016 -1,797 -640 
CNP / Income 0.55% -12.5% -2.18% -0.68% -0.83% -0.76% 
Contingency reserves -500 2,223 -1,275 326 525 541 
CNP + Contingency reserves 73 -22,797 -16,480 -690 -1,272 -99 
Cumulated contributions in capital 
(CCC) 1,771 7,550 14,918 1,796 2,738 1,598 
Cumulated contribution in partner’s 
account (CCA) 0 0 20,296 1 0 -39 
Cumulated cancellations of loans 
(CCL) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cumulated shareholders’ 
contributions (CSC) 1,771 7,550 35,214 1,797 2,738 1,559 
Amount of the contribution in 
capital used to cover losses (CovL) 0 7,550 15,205 1,016 1,797 640 
% contribution in capital used to 
cover losses (%CovL) 0% 100% 43% 57% 66% 41% 
Shareholders’ contribution 
available for investment (SCI) 1,771 0 20,009 781 941 919 
Net transfer investments -1,108 -11,311 -6,422 248 -763 -20 
Net other investments 8,078 3,937 19,796 1,746 -1,052 -199 
Net investments (Inv) 6,970 -7,374 13,374 1,994 -1,815 -219 
% investments covered by 
shareholders’ contributions (%Inv) 25% 0% 150% 39% -52% -420% 
Income including transfers 104,437 200,652 697,707 149,402 217,286 83,807 
% net investments / income 6.67% 
 
1.92% 1.33% 
  
Sources: DNCG reports, Club individual accounts, seasons 2005 to 2014, data shaped by the authors. 
Data used classified per club (Continued) 
 
DFCO HAC RCL FCL LOSC ASM 
Cumulative losses -1,427 -6,909 -51,999 -4,173 -26,778 -210,086 
Cumulative profits before 
cancellations of loans 1,510 2,131 13,179 9,214 15,503 0 
Cumulative net profit (CNP) 
before cancellations of loans 83 -4,778 -38,820 5,041 -11,275 -210,086 
CNP / Income 0.08% -3.01% -10.3% 1.71% -1.48% -38.7% 
Contingency reserves 115 -921 -6,192 2,519 -5,138 -773 
CNP + Contingency reserves 198 -5,699 -45,012 7,560 -16,413 -210,859 
Cumulated contributions in capital 
(CCC) 2,509 3,634 21,491 -1,278 18,168 1,419 
Cumulated contribution in 
partner’s account (CCA) 0 -1,890 3,509 -54 10,000 148,614 
Cumulated cancellations of loans 
(CCL) 0 0 0 0 0 210,100 
Cumulated shareholders’ 
contributions (CSC) 2,509 1,744 25,000 -1,332 28,168 360,133 
Amount of the contribution in 
capital used to cover losses (CovL) 0 1,744 25,000 0 11,275 210,086 
% contribution in capital used to 
cover losses (%CovL) 0% 100% 100% 0% 40% 58% 
Shareholders’ contribution 
available for investment (SCI) 2,509 0 0 0 16,893 150,047 
Net transfer investments 49 -41 -20,520 4,282 12,259 127,919 
Net other investments 1,563 1,853 -40,560 8,148 36,445 2,404 
Net investments (Inv) 1,612 1,812 -61,080 12,430 48,704 130,323 
% investments covered by 
shareholders’ contributions (%Inv) 156% 0% 0% 0% 35% 115% 
Income including transfers 101,636 158,641 376,954 295,566 760,742 542,679 
% net investments / income 1.59% 1.14% 
 
4.21% 6.40% 24.01% 
 
Data used classified per club (Continued) 
 
MHSP ASNL FCN OGCN OL OM 
Cumulative losses -2,887 -20,090 -44,187 -22,941 -137,363 -75,879 
Cumulative profits before 
cancellations of loans 11,565 11,020 411 7,276 44,033 23,939 
Cumulative net profit (CNP) 
before cancellations of loans 8,678 -9,070 -43,776 -15,665 -93,330 -51,940 
CNP / Income 2.64% -3.06% -19.73 -4.62% -7.52% -4.69% 
Contingency reserves -188 30 -2,027 828 2,143 -10,210 
CNP + Contingency reserves 8,490 -9,040 -45,803 -14,837 -91,187 -62,150 
Cumulated contributions in capital 
(CCC) 2,949 1,636 18,681 5,476 106,503 8,151 
Cumulated contribution in 
partner’s account (CCA) -245 6,461 -10,648 6,173 0 -1,162 
Cumulated cancellations of loans 
(CCL) 0 0 25,000 0 0 40,000 
Cumulated shareholders’ 
contributions (CSC) 2,704 8,097 33,033 11,649 106,503 46,989 
Amount of the contribution in 
capital used to cover losses 
(CovL) 
0 8,097 33,033 11,649 93,330 46,989 
% contribution in capital used to 
cover losses (%CovL) 0% 100% 100% 100% 88% 100% 
Shareholders’ contribution 
available for investment (SCI) 2,704 0 0 0 13,173 0 
Net transfer investments 3,330 -7,006 -3,306 -6,518 -22,755 33,757 
Net other investments 5,967 908 -1,059 1,339 88,641 14,925 
Net investments (Inv) 9,297 -6,098 -4,365 -5,179 65,886 48,682 
% investments covered by 
shareholders’ contributions (%Inv) 29% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 
Income including transfers 328,961 295,946 221,891 338,961 1,240,551 1,106,573 
% net investments / income 2.83% 
   
5.31% 4.40% 
 
  
Data used classified per club 
 
PSG SR FCSM ASSE TFC VAFC 
Cumulative losses -285,058 -15,925 -34,559 -6,619 -3,332 -25,314 
Cumulative profits before 
cancellations of loans 0 0 11,148 2,867 7,599 3,554 
Cumulative net profit (CNP) 
before cancellations of loans -285,058 -15,925 -23,411 -3,752 4,267 -21,760 
CNP / Income -18.36% -3.81% -6.39% -1.00% 1.05% -8.46% 
Contingency reserves 586 804 974 -572 2,244 -202 
CNP + Contingency reserves -284,472 -15,121 -22,437 -4,324 6,511 -21,962 
Cumulated contributions in capital 
(CCC) 92,448 18,712 13,004 -1,030 -2,958 11,819 
Cumulated contribution in 
partner’s account (CCA) 45,995 -6,474 0 -29 349 -505 
Cumulated cancellations of loans 
(CCL) 217,000 0 0 0 0 0 
Cumulated shareholders’ 
contributions (CSC) 355,443 12,238 13,004 -1,059 -2,609 11,314 
Amount of the contribution in 
capital used to cover losses (CovL) 285,058 12,238 13,004 0 0 11,314 
% contribution in capital used to 
cover losses (%CovL) 80% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 
Shareholders’ contribution 
available for investment (SCI) 70,385 0 0 0 0 0 
Net transfer investments 257,747 115 -9,929 5,212 4,047 -4,124 
Net other investments 37,649 -1,690 -2,544 7,415 -4,003 8,236 
Net investments (Inv) 295,396 -1,575 -12,473 12,627 44 4,112 
% investments covered by 
shareholders’ contributions (%Inv) 24% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Income including transfers 1,552,545 418,399 366,333 374,627 406,470 257,212 
% net investments / income 19.03% 
  
3.37% 0.01% 1.60% 
 
  
Tables 
Table 1. Presentation of net profit per club. 
 
Cumulative losses (CL) Cumulative profits (CP) 
CL / CP 
Cumulative 
net profit 
(CNP) 
CNP / 
Income 
 
Amount Number of years Amount 
Number of 
years 
PSG -285,058 8 0 0 - -285,058 -18.36% 
ASM -210,086 8 0 0 - -210,086 -38.71% 
OL -137,363 5 44,033 3 3.12 -93,330 -7.52% 
OM -75,879 4 23,939 4 3.17 -51,940 -4.69% 
FCN -44,187 6 411 2 107.51 -43,776 -19.73% 
RCL -51,999 6 13,179 2 3.95 -38,820 -10.30% 
AJA -29,411 4 4,391 2 6.70 -25,020 -12.47% 
FCSM -34,559 3 11,148 5 3.10 -23,411 -6.39% 
VAFC -25,314 4 3,554 4 7.12 -21,760 -8.46% 
SR -15,925 2 0 0 - -15,925 -3.81% 
OGCN -22,941 5 7,276 3 3.15 -15,665 -4.62% 
GB -36,718 4 21,513 4 1.71 -15,205 -2.18% 
LOSC -26,778 5 15,503 3 1.73 -11,275 -1.48% 
ASNL -20,090 3 11,020 5 1.82 -9,070 -3.06% 
HAC -6,909 5 2,131 3 3.24 -4,778 -3.01% 
ASSE -6,619 2 2,867 4 2.31 -3,752 -1.00% 
SMC -4,839 4 3,042 4 1.59 -1,797 -0.83% 
SB29 -4,486 4 3,470 4 1.29 -1,016 -0.68% 
LBC -1,598 4 958 4 1.67 -640 -0.76% 
DFCO -1,427 2 1,510 6 0.95 83 0.08% 
ACA -6,387 4 6,960 4 0.92 573 0.55% 
TFC -3,332 4 7,599 4 0.44 4,267 1.05% 
FCL -4,173 2 9,214 6 0.45 5,041 1.71% 
MHFC -2,887 2 11,565 6 0.25 8,678 2.64% 
 
  
Table 2. Classification of clubs: cumulative net profit as a percentage of income. 
CNP > 0 -5%I < CNP < 0 -10%I < CNP < -5%I CNP < -10%I 
AC Ajaccio 
Dijon FCO 
FC Lorient 
Montpellier HC 
Toulouse FC 
 
G Bordeaux 
S Brestois 
SM Caen 
B Châteauroux 
Le Havre AC 
Lille OSC 
O Marseille 
AS Nancy 
OGC Nice 
S Rennais 
AS Saint-Etienne 
O Lyonnais 
FC Sochaux 
Valenciennes FC 
 
AJ Auxerre 
RC Lens 
AS Monaco 
FC Nantes 
Paris SG 
 
Q = 5 Q = 11 Q = 3 Q = 5 
20.8% 45.9% 12.5% 20.8% 
 
  
Table 3. Shareholders’ contributions per club and use in the covering of losses. 
 
Cumulative 
contributions 
in capital 
Cumulative 
contributions 
in 
shareholders’ 
loan 
accounts 
Cumulative 
cancellations 
of loans 
Cumulative 
shareholders’ 
contributions 
(CSC) 
Contribution 
in capital 
used to 
cover losses 
(CovL) 
CovL / 
CSC 
TFC -2,958 349 
 
-2,609 0 0% 
FCL -1,278 -54 
 
-1,332 0 0% 
ASSE -1,030 -29 
 
-1,059 0 0% 
ACA 1,771 0 
 
1,771 0 0% 
DFCO 2,509 0 
 
2,509 0 0% 
MHSP 2,949 -245 
 
2,704 0 0% 
LOSC 18,168 10,000 
 
28,168 11,275 40% 
LBC 1,598 -39 
 
1,559 640 41% 
GB 14,918 20,296 
 
35,214 15,205 43% 
SB29 1,796 1 
 
1,797 1,016 57% 
ASM 1,419 148,614 210,100 360,133 210,086 58% 
SMC 2,738 0 
 
2,738 1,797 66% 
PSG 92,448 45,995 217,000 355,443 285,058 80% 
OL 106,503 0 
 
106,503 93,330 88% 
HAC 3,634 -1,890 
 
1,744 1,744 100% 
AJA 7,550 0 
 
7,550 7,550 100% 
ASNL 1,636 6,461 
 
8,097 8,097 100% 
VAFC 11,819 -505 
 
11,314 11,314 100% 
OGCN 5,476 6,173 
 
11,649 11,649 100% 
SR 18,712 -6,474 
 
12,238 12,238 100% 
FCSM 13,004 0 
 
13,004 13,004 100% 
RCL 21,491 3,509 
 
25,000 25,000 100% 
FCN 18,681 -10,648 25,000 33,033 33,033 100% 
OM 8,151 -1,162 40,000 46,989 46,989 100% 
Total 1,064,157 789,025 74% 
 
  
Table 4. Club investments and funding by their shareholders. 
 
Investments 
(Inv) 
Inv / 
Income 
Shareholders’ 
contribution 
available for 
investment 
(SCI) 
SCI / Inv 
LBC -219 0 919 -420% 
SMC -1,815 0 941 -52% 
AJA -7,374 0 0 0% 
ASNL -6,098 0 0 0% 
ASSE 12,627 3.37% 0 0% 
FCL 12,430 4.21% 0 0% 
FCN -4,365 0 0 0% 
FCSM -12,473 0 0 0% 
HAC 1,812 1.14% 0 0% 
OGCN -5,179 0 0 0% 
OM 48,682 4.40% 0 0% 
RCL -61,080 0 0 0% 
SR -1,575 0 0 0% 
TFC 44 0.01% 0 0% 
VAFC 4,112 1.60% 0 0% 
OL 65,886 5.31% 13,173 20% 
PSG 295,396 19.03% 70,385 24% 
ACA 6,970 6.67% 1,771 25% 
MHSP 9,297 2.83% 2,704 29% 
LOSC 48,704 6.40% 16,893 35% 
SB29 1,994 1.33% 781 39% 
ASM 130,323 24.01% 150,047 115% 
GB 13,374 1.92% 20,009 150% 
DFCO 1,612 1.59% 2,509 156% 
Average  3.64%   
Total 553,085  280,132  
 
  
Table 5. Club investments and disinvestments 2006-2014. 
 Transfer fees Number 
of clubs Other investments 
Number 
of clubs Total investments 
Number 
of clubs 
Total 
disinvestments 
-93,823 13 -51,107 7 -144,930 9 
Total 
investments 
448,965 11 249,050 17 698,015 15 
Total 355,142 24 197,943 24 553,085 24 
Percentage 64%  36%  100%  
 
  
Figure 
Figure 1. Aims of FFP regulations.32 
1
 These regulations aim: 
a) to further promote and continuously improve the standard of all aspects of football in 
Europe and to give continued priority to the training and care of young players in every 
club; 
b) to ensure that clubs have an adequate level of management and organisation; 
c) to adapt clubs’ sporting infrastructure to provide players, spectators and media 
representatives with suitable, well-equipped and safe facilities; 
d) to protect the integrity and smooth running of the UEFA club competitions; 
e) to allow the development of benchmarking for clubs in financial, sporting, legal, 
personnel, administrative and infrastructure-related criteria throughout Europe. 
 
2
 Furthermore, they aim to achieve financial fair play in UEFA club competitions and in 
particular: 
a) to improve the economic and financial capability of the clubs, increasing their 
transparency and credibility; 
b) to place the necessary importance on the protection of creditors and to ensure that clubs 
settle their liabilities with employees, social/tax authorities and other clubs punctually; 
c) to introduce more discipline and rationality in club football finances; 
d) to encourage clubs to operate on the basis of their own revenues; 
e) to encourage responsible spending for the long-term benefit of football; 
f) to protect the long-term viability and sustainability of European club football. 
 
 
